An article by Rahul Ramagundam which provides a new ( controversial
though!) way of looking at the reality of Bihar. Rahul is a friend of
Bihar Chintan.
It appeared in the Indian Express, New Delhi, dated 31st March 2005
May be of interest.
Rajesh

AFTER THE ELECTION
The continuing war against social privilege

Laloo's anti-elite revolution may have undermined state institutions
but it has broken upper caste hegemony

RAHUL RAMAGUNDAM
Posted online: Thursday, March 31, 2005 at 0000 hours IST

Now that the dust has settled on the Bihar elections, one
question needs analysis: Was Laloo's 15-year-rule retrogressive or
revolutionary?

Laloo has been consistently accused of presiding over the gradual
demise of institutions of governance in Bihar. During his regime, it
is said, Bihar degenerated into anarchy. A myriad of non-state actors
that came into being during the reign of Laloo, indulged in
competitive dismantling of the state. Even in pre-Laloo Bihar, state
and its capacity to deliver just ruling was repeatedly compromised.

During Laloo's phase, dismantling of state-institutions attained crass
proportions and was done brazenly by anti-establishment rhetoric. If
there are any institutions in Bihar that simultaneously curse as well
as celebrate, they are the media and judiciary. Rightly so, as these
two institutions were out of the purview of Laloo's rule and therefore
could withstand his assaults and launch counter-attacks. Other
institutions like the legislature and executive caved in and became
ineffectual. But this impotency of the institutions says as much about
Laloo, as about their own character.

What Laloo did was to adopt two-pronged strategy to bend institutional
collaboration with elite and upper caste in resource-use rivalry, if
not by intent, then by default. One, he de-capacitated the state and
its institutions by resorting to informal means of power
dissemination. Second, he restrained the state's role in the
development of common cake that had the redistributive potential. It
was here that the role of state institutions was historically suspect.
They mostly sided with an upper class base. By de-capacitating state
institutions, he obviated the possibility of state institutions taking
sides in the rivalry over resources. In that sense, groups like the
MCC became ascendant.

During Laloo's regime if anything had unsurpassed growth, it was the
sector of informal institutions such as MCC or its counter-player the
Ranvir Sena and others. By not letting the state intervene in the
production of common cake, he punctuated its appropriation by most
able groups. The feudal norm results in society not asking any
questions. And when modern democratic institutions become handmaidens
to feudal norms, it further diminishes society's right to ask
questions. Something similar had happened in Bihar since Independence.
Bihar's political families had enviable 'social capital' which they
used for maintenance of their interest amidst all trouble and turmoil.
Their control over means of production, and thus economic
accumulation, apparatus of governance such as civil and coercive
bureaucracy, and political power through the legislature, was
complete. It was they who became society's spokespersons because of
the political clout they wielded, which came from their hold over
state resources. It was they who gained access to the executive arm of
governance by means of establishing meritocracy in bureaucratic
selection; it was they who interpreted law by means of the judiciary.
They not only foisted policies that were hospitable to their interest
but also simultaneously frustrated policies and measures perceived to
be inhospitable to self-interest.

Repeatedly, even while measures such as abolition of zamindari were
taken, they were never implemented. Leaders such as Kapoori Takhur or
Daroga Rai, though different from the mould of Congress politicians,
had not completely broken the stranglehold of the upper caste
politicians. It was Laloo who ultimately picked up the gauntlet to
tame upper caste influence in politics. But federal laws, rules and
regulations limited his capacity to wrest control of the state. In
such situations, to bring into being the power-shift in the
controlling authority of Bihar, he had to adopt ideas and tactics that
were the only options available to him but no less revolutionary.

Revolutions have both a destructive and constructive aspect. In
Gandhi, India saw a revolutionary who attempted to combine both
aspects in his praxis. In JP too, there was a semblance of both,
however unformed they might have been. Laloo could not visualise
beyond destruction. Or did he visualise it this time, when he said,
"Development: Now or never". He could have played a role of enabler by
providing enhanced opportunities for wealth-generation to an increased
number of people from his constituency. He could have built
infrastructure, facilitated the market, improved indexes of human
development. But non-development was his chest-thumping achievement.
Was it due to his personal or historical limitations? Why did Laloo,
seemingly a captor of the Yadav vote bank in Bihar, not initiate
reforms in the Tenancy Act, when Yadavs constitute the largest number
of share-croppers in the state? Perhaps because institutions that
frustrated abolishing of zamindari could still frustrate tenancy
reform.

In this failure is also hidden Laloo's limited hold over institutions
of governance despite the power-shift he created in the legislature.
To introduce tenancy reform, he took the help of the informal arena
built by non-state actors such as MCC, whose growth was facilitated
substantially by his dismantling of the state. Why is that Bihar's
poor are reluctant to ask one question that could substantially alter
their lives? As yet, the poor aren't prepared to ask why is that some
have acres of land and they who work on such land remain largely
landless. Does that say anything about the nature of institutions?

Laloo could change the character of legislature by introducing
representation of people with no lofty background but with a backward
tag alone. He could tame the executive by reigning in the bureaucracy,
although he did succeed in altering its recruiting base too. In doing
so, he successfully exposed the class character of state institutions.
And now, in Bihar, elite's hegemony is in complete dishevelment. This
is by no means any less revolutionary.

(The writer is a researcher )