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Dinesh Mishra 









Bihar Floods- International Dimensions

Dinesh Kumar Mishra

Floods in Bihar      Bihar is located down the Himalayas which is in the nascent stage of its formation and is just a loose heap of earth. When rain falls over such a loose soil, it washes down the detritus, and a lot of sediment that comes along the river waters, collect in plains.  That is how the rivers build their delta. The collected sediment becomes an obstruction to the river water in the coming season and that leads to the change in course of the rivers and flooding of new areas. The northern Gangetic plains of Bihar are undergoing this process since ages and the process has not yet stopped. This leads to hardships to the people living in the plains during the flood season.

Our ancestors had developed their ways of facing this annual problem but they must have found the flood balance-sheet in their favor that they chose to stay here despite seasonal problems. After the British occupation of India, the colonial rulers were finding it difficult to collect revenue from the flood plains of the Ganga and the Brahmaputra basin because of inaccessibility and that, probably, prompted them to call the Damodar as Sorrow of Bengal and the Kosi as the Sorrow of Bihar and so on. The ‘natives’, however, kept calling these rivers as their ‘fathers’ of ‘mothers’ (The Damodar is rated as a male river).

The British then thought of taming the rivers to protect the flood plains. This would improve their accessibility to the ‘natives’ and slap a levy on them in the name of flood control. When the floods are controlled, their would be a demand for irrigation and having arranged that, they would get another opportunity to charge canal rates for proving irrigation. Unfortunately for them, when they tamed the Damodar, starting 1854, by embanking the river; they found that by so doing the bed level of the river had started rising, the flood level within the embankments had risen alarmingly, there was massive waterlogging in the so called protected countryside of the embankments and, in 1861, malaria broke out in Burdwan as an epidemic. Extension of Railways and road network following the ‘Sepoy Mutiny’ and construction of the Eden Canals added to their woes. This was coupled with frequent breaches in the embankment. The British demolished the Damodar embankments by 1869 without making it a prestige issue. They never attempted to tame any other river as long they stayed in this country.

There was a big embankment debate during the British regime in India over the issue whether embankments reduce the floods or aggravate them but the general feeling was that embankments do more harm than good to the river and the affected people. As the large dams gained acceptance in the USA, with occasional provision of flood cushion in them, their echo was heard in India too and it was in 1937, in flood conference at Patna, the then secretary of the Bihar Public Works Department- Jimut Bahan Sen proposed to tame the Kosi by damming the river at a point where it debauches into the plains. This spot, however, is located in Nepal. Capt. G.F.Hall, then Chief Engineer of the Irrigation Department in the state was of the view that the suggestion was not acceptable because the cost of such a construction ‘should be within somebody’s capacity to pay’ and that India had no direct access to the site, being located in Nepal. He was of the view that Nepal would never inconvenience herself for the benefit of Bihar. He went on to add that Nepal was invited to the workshop but none turned up from their side nor did they care to respond. He was sore, probably, because the British were unhappy over the boundary disputes where the rivers were the deciding factor.

The things changed with Indian independence in sight when C.H.Bhabha, the member planning at the centre, announced in a public meeting at Nirmali (Dist Supaul) in Bihar, on the 6th April 1947, that a dam on the Kosi would be built soon and smiles would return on the faces of the people ravaged by the Kosi. Dr. Rajendra Prasad, then member Agriculture at the centre and later, the first President of India, was also present in this meeting and had said that he wished he would survive to see the dream come true. That dream never came true till date and the people had to be contended with the embankments on the Kosi. However, days before Indian independence in 1947, Nepal agreed to an Indian proposal to investigate a high dam on the Kosi at Barahkshetra. This dam has not yet been built – indeed, detailed investigations still have not begun – because the two governments have not reached agreement over sharing costs and benefits.

The ghost of the Barahkshetra Dam haunts the planners, engineers and the politicians whenever floods in Bihar are discussed. In reply to a call attention motion of Ram Vilas Paswan regarding floods in Bihar, Arjun Charan Sethi, Minister of Water Resources at the Centre told the Lok Sabha, on the 22nd August 2003, ‘…So far as Bihar is concerned, we are having constant interaction with the Government of Nepal because we all know these rivers originate from Nepal. Unless we have any kind of agreement with Nepal, this problem cannot be solved. The proposal for setting up of the Joint Project Office in Nepal for taking up field investigations and preparation of Detailed Project Report has since been approved. 100 officials from Nepal, and 42 officials from India are to carry out field investigations and studies. The project will inter alia have 269 meters high dam with an installed capacity of 3,300 MW and irrigation benefits accruing both to India and Nepal.’ This year (2004) Priya Ranjan Dasmunshi, central minister of Water Resources said something very similar in Kishangunj on the 5th June 2004.

Jagadanand, Water Resource Minister of Bihar, asserted in Bihar Vidhan Sabha  (22 nd July 2002), ‘…Sir, the last point, no discharge control-no flood control. Unless the discharge is controlled, the scientists all over the world are convinced that the floods cannot be controlled…Embankments do not control the discharge, they can, at best, prevent water from spreading. Weak embankments cannot hold uncontrolled discharge and the flood will continue to bother us as a natural calamity. If we want to control floods in this state, we will have to control discharge in the upper riparian states and the neighbouring countries. We have had negotiations with them and have unanimously agreed that to proceed jointly.’

Such speeches are made regularly by the central and state ministers since Bhabha’s address at Nirmali (1947) but even after a lapse of 57 years, the text of the speech does not change. Since convincing Nepal about the viability of the dams in Nepal and reaching an agreement is a job of international nature, it becomes the responsibility of the Central Government. And, water being a state subject in India, it often leads to the passing of the flood buck between the center and the state, each blaming the other for not doing its job properly. It takes an interesting turn when different parties rule at Delhi and in Patna. The blame of floods is passed on to the centre for negotiating the construction of Barahkshetra Dam in Nepal. There has been almost 40 years when the Congress was ruling simultaneously at Delhi and Patna and in recent past, there was friendly Government at the centre when Devegowda and Gujral were ruling the country. Devegowda found time to negotiate the Farakka Agreement (1996) with Bangladesh, he could have done that with Nepal also but that did not happen. We again have friendly governments at Patna and Delhi, at the moment, and it will be interesting to watch the progress. If only the Kosi High Dam is the solution to the problem facing North Bihar, and that it is beneficial to both the countries, why India has not been able to convince Nepal about the same and why Nepal has been evading a positive response?

Progress at Snail’s Speed     Some thirteen years ago, in 1991, the Government of India (GoI) and the His Majesty’s Government of Nepal (HMGN) had agreed for joint studies/investigations to finalize the parameters of the Kosi High Dam Multipurpose Project at Barahkshetra expeditiously. A Joint Committee of Experts JCE was expected to finalize the modalities of investigations and methods of assessment of the benefits. The two sides were to start investigations to prepare a detailed project report following the finalization of modalities. The HMGN provided the GoI with an inception report in 1993 and a Joint Committee of Experts was constituted in 1996-97. In one of the meetings of the JCE, a representative of the Government of Bihar was also allowed to participate. It was hoped then that the work on the preparation of the DPR would start soon. The Annual Report of the Water Resources Department, Government of Bihar expressed its frustration by saying, ‘..Despite repeated efforts, no significant progress has been made on the decisions taken in the January ’97 meeting. This matter was discussed in the Prime Minister’s office in Delhi on the 16th October 1998 and it was hoped that an office would be set up soon to work on the DPR of the Kosi High Dam.

Sethi’s statement in the Parliament (2003) was a step ahead in the direction of preparation of the DPR as the staff strength to be deployed on this work was decided. There are regular announcements from the Ministry of Water Resources (UPA Government-2004) at the center that an office would soon start functioning at Viratnagar in Nepal. Unfortunately, it took 13 years to reach such a small decision and that speaks volumes about the impedance in the progress and the cautions that are being exercised from both sides. Another question that needs to be answered is that what the joint study team was doing, since 1991, in Kathmandu if the investigations are to start now? How many years will it take to construct the dam, at this rate?

Nepal’s Concerns and Other Related Issues           There is a widespread feeling in Nepal that India has manipulated the Kosi and the Gandak water and that most of the benefits of the Kosi and the Gandak Project have gone to India. She is not happy the way Bhimnagar barrage on the Kosi was located at the Indo Nepal border, although within the Nepalese territory, since a similar barrage was proposed at Chatra, in Nepal, which could have brought more areas under irrigation there. Similar feeling exists in case of the Gandak Project too. Nepali people are also wary of the unfounded charges made by Indians, more so by responsible politicians, that they release waters from their dams that causes flooding downstream. There are other irritants too over the water related projects along the Indo-Nepal border and, it seems, Nepal wants to take all the cautions that it can take in the matter and this causes delay. Mahakali Treaty between India and Nepal (1996), although ratified by the Nepalese Parliament by a two-third majority, is also viewed with similar suspicion in Nepal. There is no agreement reached over the Barahkshetra Dam between the two countries but it does exist over the Pancheshwar Dam on the Mahakali and, yet, no progress is made there on that dam too. 

What are the constraints with Nepal, one does not know. But if the thirty year delay in the construction of Masan dam on the river Masan in West Champaran district of Bihar can be cited as an example, it throws sufficient light over the tangle. This construction has not been possible because the dam would submerge 1400 acres of forest land and the Department of Forests of the Government of Bihar is not giving a go ahead signal to the Water Resources Department of the State Government. The site is finalized, engineers are placed there, colonies have been constructed and huge amount of money is being spent on the establishment there. “.. When your own Government is not allowing to build the dam for petty considerations, how do expect the Nepal Government to accord sanction for building the dam there.?” asks K.N.Lal, former Engineer in Chief of Dept of Water Resources in Bihar. There may be many such posers, and in fact they are, that need to be answered before an agreement is arrived at. This may relate to sharing of costs and benefits, seismicity affects over and due to the dam, strategic defence of the structures, submergence, rehabilitation and the financial resources etc. These factors are never known to the public, which is expected to believe that the construction of the dam would start in the next season for the past 57 years.

Incidentally, the ‘benefit’ that have accrued on the Indian side, following the construction of the Eastern Kosi Main Canal, is that it irrigates around 18 per cent of the target and the Western Kosi Canal, that is still under construction, irrigates just 3 per cent of its stated target. This canal has consumed 40 times the original cost of the project till date (2004) and the percentage of irrigation is yet to reach the double figure mark in relation to its stated objective. The Kosi Embankments have breached at Dalwa (in Nepal in 1963), at Jamlpur in Darbhanga (1968), at Bhatania in Supaul (1971), at Bahuarwa in Saharsa (1980), at Hempur in Saharsa (1984), at Ghonghepur and Samani in Saharsa (1987), at Joginia (In Nepal 1991). “..This embankment is a time bomb placed over head and can explode any time..” says Shraddhanand of village Navhatta in Saharsa.

The situation with the incomplete Gandak Project which consumed ten times its estimated cost in the first phase is no better either. In this most waterlogged basin in Bihar, against a target of 11.53 lakh hectares, the Gandak Canals irrigated 3.61, 3.80, and 2.95 lakh hectares respectively in the crop seasons of 1999-2000, 2000-01 and 2001-02. Then there is the case around 800,000 people trapped within the Kosi embankments who have not been rehabilitated properly till date.  These ‘benefits’, however, cannot be made public by the Government as it would point towards many skeletons in its cupboard. Only a people to people dialogue on either side of the border can clear the mist.

Will Brahkshetra Dam Be Able to Control Floods in Bihar? The Second Irrigation Commission (1994) of Bihar, suggests that the Kosi has a catchment area of 59,550sq km at site No: 13 where the Kosi High Dam(KHD) is proposed to be built. Below this site No:13, the Kosi has an additional catchment area of 2,266sq km up to Bhimnagar barrage and 11,410sq.km. between Bhimnagar and Kursela where the river joins the Ganga. This brings the total catchment area below the dam to 13,676sq km, which, is only slightly less than that of the catchment area of the Bagmati and nearly double that of the Kamala. Those who have seen the Bagmati and the Kamala in spate can well imagine the quantity of water passing through these rivers. This much of water will always flow below the dam and try to enter the Kosi which, the existing embankments will prevent from entering the river, as is happening at the moment. Hence there will no change in the waterlogging condition outside the embankments at all. And, since all the water cannot be held behind the dam in the rainy season, the release from the dam will always keep the population within the embankments on their toes, as usual.

Whether the dam is built or not as long as the embankments on the Kosi are intact, there will be no let up in the floods within the embankments and waterlogging outside the embankments. Further, this dam, if ever built, can at best flatten the peak floods only marginally in the Kosi Basin and it will not solve all the problem of Bihar floods as is being propagated. And, why should Nepal be interested in floods of Bihar? Its own interest will be in the irrigation and the power rates that it might get following the construction of the dam. For India, too, it is the hydropower that is of interest but since, it is easier to market the dam in the name of flood control, flood strategy is adopted.

One really does not know whether the proposed dams in Nepal would really be built or not. It is about the time that one starts thinking of the interim plans to tackle floods and tackle them locally. It should also be understood that the problem is not how to route water but how to route sediments. The sediment that has been deposited between the embankments, would not spare the High Dams also, reducing its life drastically. The best thing would be to learn the flood coping mechanism of the people, improve it with the modern scientific knowledge, and develop the techniques of ‘living with floods’ instead of ‘flood fighting’. That would also help in doing away with any flood cushion in the dams thereby reducing the height and cost of the dams. In that case, the dams can be built just for irrigation and power production, if at all. It will also spare the engineers and politicians from blaming rats and foxes for casing holes in the embankments, charge anti-socials for affecting breaches in the structures or blaming Nepal for releasing waters that flood the plains in India.

Dinesh Kumar Mishra
Convenor- Barh Mukti Abhiyan
C-7 Vatika Green City
PO  MGMC  Dimna Road
Jamshedpur 831018, Jharkhand
Ph:  0657-2362520  /  2650844  Mob: 9431303360
23rd August 2004